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Abstract 
Our research examines people’s concept of ‘meaningful behavior’ from an expectancy x 
value perspective. Specifically, we argue that people consider two elements when inferring 
the meaningfulness of behavior: the value of the goals that the behavior relates to and the 
degree to which the behavior is useful for the achievement of these goals. A series of five 
studies demonstrates that behavior is considered to be ‘meaningful’ if it is highly 
instrumental for a highly valued goal. Our expectancy x value approach offers a 
straightforward yet crucial perspective of how people infer whether or not everyday life 
behaviors are meaningful to them. The implications of our findings for research on 
meaningfulness, meaning-regulation, and sense making are discussed. 
 Keywords: meaning, value, instrumentality, self-regulation 
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On the Meaningfulness of Behavior: An Expectancy x Value Approach 
Psychological research has recognized humans’ important need to perceive life as 
meaningful (e.g., Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). 
Meaningfulness has been found to correlate with factors such as life satisfaction, happiness, 
and work enjoyment (e.g., Bonebright, Clay, & Ankenmann, 2000; Chamberlain & Zika, 
1988; Debats, Van der Lubbe, & Wezeman, 1993), and a lack of meaningfulness is associated 
with, for example, decreased well-being, depression, anxiety, and substance abuse (Adler & 
Fagley, 2005; Debats et al., 1993; Harlow, Newcomb, & Bentler, 1986; see also Steger, 
Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006). Not surprisingly, an increased amount of psychological 
research has turned to the investigation of how people derive and maintain a sense of 
meaningfulness. In social psychology, most research has focused on the many consequences 
of threats to perceptions of meaning (e.g., existential threats such as death, uncertainty, 
boredom, and ostracism; Case & Williams, 2004; Greenberg et al., 2004; Van den Bos, 2001; 
Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012; Williams, 2002) and its subsequent consequences on meaning 
maintenance strategies such as fairness behavior (Van den Bos, 2001), nostalgia (Sedikides, 
Wildschut, & Baden, 2004), or worldview defense (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszcynski, 
1997; see also Heine, et al., 2006; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011a). 
Notwithstanding the central role that the concept of meaning plays within the 
abovementioned research, definitions of this concept are typically vague, sometimes implicit, 
and often inconsistent. On the one hand, meaning has been associated with terms such as 
purposefulness, personal growth (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998), self-transcendence (e.g., 
Seligman, 2002), or authentic goal pursuit (Kasser & Sheldon, 2004). On the other hand, 
Heine and colleagues (2006) suggests that ’meaning is relation’, which is described as “what 
connects things to other things in expected ways” (pp. 90-91). Similarly, Baumeister (1992) 
identifies meaning as a “shared mental representation of possible relationships among things, 
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events, and relationships” (p. 15), and other researchers emphasize that meaning is closely 
related to coherence and need for closure (e.g., Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004; Kenyon, 2000; 
see also Baumeister, 1992, p.17). These definitions have their merits, however, a more 
precise conceptualization is required in order to increase the predictability of people’s 
evaluations of behavior, especially when it relates to meaning-regulation processes. 
Moreover, a conceptualization of meaning should be tested empirically to ensure that this 
complex concept bears relevance to the use of the term in everyday life. 
Our approach builds on the assumption that expectancy x value processes underlies 
how people’s understandings of meaningful behavior fits into the broader assumptions of 
these meaning-regulation processes. In this respect, we are shifting from the abstract concept 
of meaning as ‘relation’ to the question of what people understand as meaningful behaviors in 
everyday life. In order to understand the role of meaning in relation to behavior, it is 
important to make a distinction between an epistemic and a teleological perspective on 
‘meaning’. 
Epistemic Meaning and Teleological Meaning 
Notwithstanding the plurality of meaning conceptualizations, it appears that research 
on meaning can be roughly divided into two main areas, reflecting the philosophical 
traditions of epistemology and teleology: meaning as a sense making process and meaning as 
an evaluation of the functionality of behaviour, respectively. 
According to the Oxford dictionary (2012), epistemology involves the study of 
knowledge and its validity, which is a―of course―a broad field. In psychology, 
epistemology involves a wide range of research areas, including general models of 
information processing, language acquisition and production, biases in judgments and 
decision making and many more. We are here concerned with the concept of ‘meaning’ 
within this perspective. Epistemic meaning reflects primarily the extent to which attributes 
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are consistent with our knowledge and expectations. The epistemological perspective thus 
concerns the meaning of concepts, how these meanings are created, and how they are 
validated or protected. The focus on epistemic meaning is, for example, reflected in research 
on reactions to the violation of expected relations (e.g., Heine et al., 2006; Proulx, Heine, & 
& Vohs, 2010; Randles, Proulx, & Heine, 2011). Moreover, epistemic meaning is an essential 
element of the cultural worldviews discussed in terror management theory (e.g., Dechesne, & 
Kruglanski, 2004; Greenberg et al., 1986; 1997), and a similar concept—meaning as 
comprehensibility—has been proposed by Janoff-Bulman and Yopyc (2004) in the context of 
making sense of extreme events such as trauma. Stimuli or experiences that do not make 
sense are deemed meaningless, including death, absurd stories (Proulx & Heine, 2009), and 
particular modern art (Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 2006; Van Tilburg & 
Igou, 2011b). 
According to the Oxford dictionary (2012), teleology involves the study of the 
purpose and function of phenomena. This second perspective on meaning revolves around the 
functionality and significance of specific acts, decisions, or subjective states. Teleological 
meaning is reflected in research that links meaningfulness to concepts such as 
purposefulness, personal growth, and self-transcendence (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998; 
Seligman, 2002; see also Deci & Ryan, 2000, Ryan & Deci, 2004). Along the same lines, 
Kasser and Sheldon (2004) argued that meaningfulness is reflected in people’s attempt to 
fulfill their “potentials and possibilities” (p. 480). Essentially, teleological meaning refers to a 
psychological appraisal of the relation between phenomena or behaviors (e.g., charity 
support) with their goals or functions (e.g., giving to charity as a means to help others) and 
the value of these goals to the individual. 
To illustrate the difference further, consider the example of running on a training 
course. An epistemic approach to meaning would pose questions such as “What does 
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‘running on a training course’ mean?” or “What knowledge is involved in running on a 
training course?”. A teleological approach to meaning would pose questions such as “Why 
would one be running on the training course?” and “How well would this behavior serve the 
purpose that it may have?”. In other words, in light of the teleological perspective, behavior 
typically involves an evaluative judgment pertaining to its functionality in the pursuit of goals 
with particular value, which relates to the components in expectancy x value models of 
motivation. We argue that in everyday life people are concerned with the question of whether 
or not their or other people’s activities are ‘meaningful’ in teleological terms. 
Expectancy x Value Processes in Teleological Meaning 
Expectancy  x value conceptualizations have a long historical tradition in self-
regulation research (e.g., Atkinson, 1957; Kruglanski et al., 2002; for an overview see 
Heckhausen & Heckhausen 2008). The value component represents the desirability of 
particular goals (i.e., why people would engage in an activity) and the expectancy component 
represents the instrumentality of means for this goal pursuit, that is, the likelihood that the 
particular goal materializes as a function of the behavior or circumstances in question (i.e., 
how much the particular activity serves its purpose). 
We argue that such an expectancy x value rationale underlies people’s inference of the 
degree to which behavior appears as meaningful. Let’s consider the example of running on a 
training course. How do people infer whether or not this behavior is meaningful? Possibly, 
people who wish to participate in a marathon would consider ‘running on a training course’ 
as meaningful because it would help them to get closer to the goal to run the marathon. That 
is, the meaningful behavior is associated with a personally valued goal and the behavior is 
instrumental for the pursuit of this goal.  
Why would behavior that serves as instrumental means in the pursuit of highly valued 
goals be associated with appraised meaningfulness? Likely, many goals that people find 
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highly valued hold the promise of personal growth, self-transcendence, and self-worth, which 
are important facets of meaning in life (for an overview see Steger et al., 2006). Along the 
same lines, Kasser and Sheldon (2004) emphasize that people seek to fulfill their “potentials 
and possibilities” (p. 480). Indeed, the consideration of instrumental goal pursuit as an 
essential facet of achieving meaningfulness is consistent with past research that relates 
meaningfulness to purposefulness, personal growth, and self-transcendence (e.g., Ryff & 
Singer, 1998; Seligman, 2002).  
Our approach is consistent with the notion that the expected value of one’s behavior 
influences people’s motivation to engage in activities (for overviews see Heckhausen & 
Heckhausen, 2008; Feather, 1982; see also Kruglanski et al., 2002). That is, people are 
committed to a goal when it is high in value and attainable. However, we focus on a crucial 
psychological variable within this paradigm: The degree to which behavior is inferred as 
meaningful. Specifically, we argue that people regard behavior as meaningful if it is 
associated with a valued goal and if it is an instrumental means for the pursuit of the valued 
goal, that is, whether or not the valued goal is attainable. 
Why is This Research Important? 
Psychological conceptualizations of meaningfulness have often implicitly been linked 
to self-regulatory processes, but an investigation of how their basic elements can be 
integrated is restricted to surprisingly few explicit articulations. Explicitly integrating the 
concept of meaningfulness of behavior within a self-regulatory paradigm subscribes to the 
critical role that meaning-regulation processes plays in the attainment of life satisfaction, 
happiness, work enjoyment, well-being, and the reduction of depression, anxiety, substance 
abuse, and many more (e.g., Adler & Fagley, 2005; Bonebright et al., 2000; Chamberlain & 
Zika, 1988; Debats et al., 1993; Harlow et al., 1986; see also Steger et al, 2006; Heine et al, 
2006).  
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We suggest that the perceived meaningfulness of behavior may explain how and why 
people respond to particular experiences. Rather than defining which specific behaviors are 
meaningful, we adopted a self-regulatory framework that is integrative with respect to 
individual and contextual variations. Whether or not a specific goal is important (e.g., highly 
valued) depends largely on the given individual or contextual characteristics. A specific type 
of behavior might be meaningful for some people but not for others, and it may be 
meaningful in one particular situation but not in another—a crucial observation for an 
appropriate understanding of when and how meaningfulness can be derived from specific 
behaviors (see also Steger et al., 2006, p. 81). In essence, we argue that inferences of 
meaningfulness of behavior are subjective and context sensitive.  
Contemporary theories in existential psychology, such as the meaning maintenance 
model (e.g., Heine et al., 2006) and terror management theory (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2004) 
ascribe a pivotal role to perceptions of meaning in explaining behavioral responses to threats 
or inconsistencies. In order to make predictions about people’s behavior, one thus has to 
recognize what behavior people perceive as meaningless or meaningful. We pose that our 
approach provides a basis for specifying the processes of meaning maintenance and meaning 
re-establishment when people face threats to meaning in their lives (e.g., Van Tilburg & Igou, 
2011). Put differently, specifying the basis of inferred meaningfulness of behavior is likely to 
increase the precision in predicting meaning-regulation processes and behavior. We report 
five studies that shed light on the inferences of meaningfulness of behavior as a function of 
goal value and instrumentality of the behavior. 
Study 1: People’s Evaluation of Meaninglessness of Their Behavior 
We first examined whether the evaluation of meaninglessness of behavior varies as a 
function of the interplay between value of goals and the instrumentality of the means for 
approaching these goals. Specifically, in this study participants recalled behaviors that would 
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fall into one of each of the four combinations of our goal value and instrumentality 
manipulations. We predicted that in comparison to all other conditions, participants would 
evaluate their own recalled behavior as least meaningless when it was associated with a 
highly valued goal and when it was instrumental for the achievement of this goal.  
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-eight undergraduate students from Tilburg 
University (Mage = 20.55, SD = 3.23; 36 men, 42 women) were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (goal value: high vs. low) x 2 (instrumentality: high vs. low) factorial design 
in exchange for course credit.
 
Procedure and materials. We conducted a pilot study in order to check for the 
effectiveness of the procedure that we planned to use for the main study. 
Pilot study. Thirty-three participants (Mage = 24.52, SD = 9.31; 13 men, 20 women) 
were randomly assigned to the same 2 x 2 factorial design as participants in the main study. 
We manipulated goal value by having participants write down a goal that was of high value 
to them (high goal value condition) versus a goal that had little value to them (low goal value 
condition). As manipulation check, we asked participants to rate the value of the goal (“To 
what extent is this goal valuable to you?”), using a seven-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). Next, we manipulated instrumentality of behavior by instructing participants to 
describe an activity that helped them to pursue the aforementioned goal (high instrumentality 
condition) or that did not help them to pursue the goal (low instrumentality condition). As 
manipulation check, we asked participants to rate the extent to which the behavior was 
helpful for pursuing the goal (“To what extent was this behavior helpful in the pursuit of this 
goal?”), using a seven-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). As expected, in the 
high goal value condition the value was perceived as higher than in the low goal value 
condition (Mhigh = 6.04, SD = 1.52 vs. Mlow = 2.20, SD = 0.92), t(31) = 7.38, p < .001, d = 
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2.65. And in the high instrumentality condition behavior was perceived as more instrumental 
than in the low instrumentality condition (Mhigh = 6.12, SD = 1.05 vs. Mlow = 1.80, SD = 
1.42), t(30) = 9.83, p < 001, d = 3.59.  These results indicate that our procedure indeed 
triggers the recall of behavior that is high or low in goal value and high or low in 
instrumentality. Given that this procedure was effective with regard to the generation of 
behaviors that fall into the goal value (high vs. low) x instrumentality (high vs. low) 
combinations, we included it in our main study. 
In the main study, participants were seated in cubicles and were given the paper & 
pencil materials. After participants gave informed consent forms and reported demographic 
information, we manipulated goal value and instrumentality of behavior as in the pilot study 
(examples of behaviors that participants listed are provide in Table 1). Afterwards, we 
assessed the perceived goal value as done in the pilot study and, importantly, also the 
perceived meaninglessness of behavior by having participants rate the extent to which they 
considered their recalled behavior as meaningless on five items “To what extent did you 
experience this activity as meaningless?”, “To what extent did you experience this activity as 
senseless?” "To what extent did you experience this activity as purposeless?”, “To what 
extent did you experience this activity as insignificant?”, and “To what extent did you 
experience this activity as worthless?” on scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).1 
Afterwards, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion
2 
Goal value. A t-test with the manipulated goal value as independent and the rated 
goal value as dependent variable confirmed that the high goal value condition yielded higher 
goal value ratings (M = 6.38, SD = 0.75) compared to the low goal value condition (M = 1.90, 
SD = 1.12), t(76) = 20.82, p < .001, d = 4.78. 
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Meaninglessness. We computed a meaninglessness score based on the five items that 
served as dependent variables (α = .91) and entered it into a two-way ANOVA with goal 
value and instrumentality as independent variables. High goal value led to lower levels of 
perceived meaninglessness of behavior than low goal value (M = 2.28, SD = 1.41 vs. M = 
2.97, SD = 1.34), F(1, 74) = 5.85, p = .02, η2 = .07, and high instrumentality of behavior led 
to lower meaninglessness ratings than low instrumentality (M = 2.35, SD = 1.41 vs. M = 2.95, 
SD = 1.37), F(1, 74) = 5.50, p = .02, η2 = .07.3 
Importantly, these main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction of goal 
value and instrumentality, F(1, 74) = 13.60, p < .001, η2 = .16. As reflected in Figure 1, 
participants rated their behavior as less meaningless when the behavior was highly 
instrumental for the pursuit of a highly valued goal (M = 1.40, SD = .57), compared to when 
instrumentality was low, (M = 3.11, SD = 1.47), t(74) = 4.30, p < .001, d = 1.00, compared to 
when the behavior was highly instrumental for a less valued goal, (M = 3.13, SD = 1.41), 
t(74) = 4.50, p < .001, d = 1.05, and compared to behavior that was low in instrumentality for 
a less valued goal (M = 2.75, SD = 1.25), t(74) = 3.21, p < .01, d = 0.75. We did not observe 
any significant differences in perceived meaninglessness of behavior whenever the goal had 
low value and/or the instrumentality of behavior was low (all ts < 1). Overall, these results 
demonstrate that people perceive behavior to be least meaningless (i.e., most meaningful) 
when it serves a valued goal, whereas behavior is perceived to be relatively meaningless 
when it does not serve a valued goal or when it serves a less valued goal.
 
Study 2: Meaningfulness Conditional on Means-Goals Relationships 
Study 2 was also designed to test the effects of goal value and instrumentality on 
perceived meaningfulness of behavior. However, in contrast to Study 1, this study tested the 
effect of means-goals variations on perceived meaningfulness of the same behavior (i.e., 
keeping the behavior constant). The assumption of this study was that meaningfulness is not 
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inherent to a specific type of behavior. Instead, meaningfulness of behavior is defined in 
relation to goals that people value and the perceived instrumentality of the behavior for these 
goals. Therefore, different effects can be expected for one and the same behavior when 
means-goals relations change. 
Participants evaluated the target behavior (‘running along the forest’s training course 
for a very long time’) either when the goal was highly valued or had little value. We also 
varied whether this behavior was instrumental for the goal or not instrumental for the goal. 
We predicted that the same behavior would be considered more meaningful when it was 
instrumental for the pursuit of a valued goal compared to when the goal did not have much 
value and/or when the behavior was not instrumental for the goal pursuit. 
Method 
Participants and design. Forty-four undergraduate students at the University of 
Limerick were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (goal value: high vs. low) x 2 
(instrumentality: high vs. low) x 2 (order of goal value: high/low vs. low/high) mixed design 
with goal value as within-participants factor and with instrumentality and order of goal value 
as between-subjects factors. One participant was an extreme outlier and excluded from the 
analysis (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), resulting in an effective sample size of forty-three 
participants (Mage = 23.53, SD = 3.68; 25 men, 19 women).
4 
Procedure and materials. Participants in the campus library gave their informed 
consent and reported demographic information. Participants were then instructed to read two 
scenarios. We asked them to imagine that they woke up early, went to the forest, and started 
running along the forest’s training course for a very long time. We manipulated goal value 
and instrumentality by altering the content of this scenario. Specifically, we stated in the high 
instrumentality condition that they performed this behavior to qualify for the New York City 
Marathon, whereas in the low instrumentality condition we stated that they tried to qualify for 
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the New York City Chess Competition. In the high goal value condition we added that this 
goal was of great value to him, whereas in the low goal value condition we added that this 
goal was of very little value to him. 
We asked participants to respond to several questions. First, we checked for the 
effectiveness of our manipulation by asking participants to rate the items “To what extent do 
you consider Frank’s goal to be valuable?” and “To what extent do you consider his behavior 
as a helpful way to pursue this goal?” on scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The 
scenarios’ instrumentality ratings were highly correlated (r = .69, p < .001) and therefore 
averaged. Next, participants rated to what extent they would consider the behavior as 
meaningful and meaningless on two items that read “To what extent do you consider Frank’s 
behaviour to be meaningful?” and “To what extent do you consider Frank’s behaviour to be 
meaningless?”, rated on seven-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Scores on the rated meaningfulness and meaninglessness items were significantly correlated 
for the high and low goal value scenarios (r = -.80, p < .001 and r = -.86, p < .001, 
respectively) and therefore combined into two composite measures (after recoding the 
meaninglessness items). Participants were thanked and debriefed after completing the study. 
Results and Discussion 
 Preliminary analysis did not reveal any reliable main effects of the order of goal value 
nor any interactions with the other independent variables (on manipulation checks all ps > 
.59; all ps > .14 for value and instrumentality, respectively; on meaningfulness of the 
behavior all ps > .52). This variable was therefore excluded from subsequent analyses. 
Manipulation checks. A t-test with instrumentality as independent variable and the 
composite instrumentality ratings as dependent variable confirmed that participants in the 
high instrumentality condition regarded the behavior as more instrumental (M = 5.48, SD = 
1.34) than participants in the low instrumentality condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.49), t(41) = 
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5.98, p < .001, d = 1.71. A paired sample t-test between participants’ goal value ratings of the 
high goal value condition and participants’ value ratings the low goal value condition 
similarly revealed that participants thought that the highly valued goal was more valued (M = 
4.77, SD = 2.02) than the little valued goal (M = 3.40, SD = 2.17), t(42) = 5.41, p < .001, d = 
1.67.
 
Meaningfulness of behavior. A one-way ANOVA for repeated measures with 
instrumentality as between-subjects factor, goal value as within-participants factor, and the 
composite measures of meaningfulness as repeated measure variable was performed. We 
observed a marginally significant influence of the instrumentality manipulation, F(1, 41) = 
3.70, p =.06, η2 = .08. Specifically, participants in the high instrumentality condition regarded 
the behavior as more meaningful (M = 4.89, SD = 0.99) compared to participants in the low 
instrumentality condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.79). In addition, participants indicated a 
significantly higher level of meaningfulness of the behavior when it was associated with high 
goal value (M = 4.77, SD = 1.97) than when it was associated with low goal value (M = 4.08, 
SD = 1.96), F(1, 41) = 4.89, p =.03, η2 = .11. Importantly, however, the main effects were 
qualified by the predicted interaction of goal value and instrumentality, F(1, 41) = 10.36, p < 
.01, η2 = .20. As reflected in Figure 2, perceived meaningfulness was highest when the 
behavior was associated with a goal that was high in value and when the behavior was high 
in instrumentality (M = 5.83, SD = 1.25), compared to when the instrumentality of behavior 
was low for a low value goal (M = 4.20, SD = 2.05), t(41) = 3.09, p < .01, d = 0.97, compared 
to when the behavior was highly instrumental for a low value goal (M = 3.95, SD = 1.90), 
t(19) = 3.31, p < .01, d = 1.52, and compared to when the behavior was low in instrumentality 
for a high value goal (M = 3.85, SD = 2.04), t(41)= 3.76, p < .001, d = 1.17. No significant 
differences were observed between the three conditions where either instrumentality was low, 
goal value was low, or both were low (all ps > .31). These results demonstrate that, as 
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predicted, the same specific behavior was only considered relatively meaningful when it was 
regarded as instrumental for a highly valued goal. 
Study 3: Relationship to a Superordinate Goal as Source of Meaningfulness 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that perceived meaningfulness of behavior is embedded 
in its instrumentality to serve a valued goal. Similar to Study 2, we tested perceived 
meaningfulness for the same behavior as a function of goal value and instrumentality. 
However, in contrast to Study 2 we presented a superordinate goal from which the goal value 
would be derived (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2002). We predicted that the target behavior would 
be perceived as more meaningful when it was associated with a superordinate goal and 
instrumental for the goal pursuit compared to when either the superordinate goal was absent 
or when instrumentality was low. 
Method 
Participants and design. Ninety-five people in Limerick’s city centre were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (goal value: high vs. low) x 2 (instrumentality: high vs. low) 
factorial design in exchange for a beverage at a local café. Two participants were excluded 
from the analysis after being identified as extreme outliers (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), 
resulting in an effective sample size of ninety-three participants (Mage = 27.29, SD = 12.71; 
36 men, 59 women). 
Procedure and materials. Participants were seated at a café and were given the 
materials. Participants gave their informed consent, reported demographic information, and 
we instructed participants to read a scenario about Frank and his behavior (similar to Study 
2). In the high instrumentality condition it was stated that Frank performed this behavior in 
order to qualify for the New York City Marathon, whereas in the low instrumentality 
condition we stated that Frank tried to qualify for the New York City Chess Competition. In 
the high goal value condition we added that Frank wanted to qualify for the event as he 
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would perceive the achievement of this goal as an “act of his victory over cancer.” We 
assumed that the superordinate goal (symbolic victory of cancer) would indirectly lend value 
to the focal goal (qualifying for a competition in New York City). In the low goal value 
condition we did not refer to a superordinate goal. 
We checked for the effectiveness of our manipulation by asking participants to 
indicate to what extent Frank’s goal was highly valued and to what extent Frank’s behavior 
was helpful for pursuing this goal with items that were identical to Study 2. Next, participants 
rated to what extent they considered the behavior as meaningful and meaningless as done in 
Study 2. Scores on the rated meaningfulness and meaninglessness items (r = -.66, p < .001) 
were combined into a composite measure (after recoding the meaninglessness item). 
Participants were thanked and debriefed at completion of the study. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. A t-test with instrumentality as independent variable and 
instrumentality ratings as dependent variable confirmed that participants in the high 
instrumentality condition regarded Frank’s behavior as more instrumental (M = 3.87, SD = 
1.95) than participants in the low instrumentality condition (M = 2.85, SD = 1.98), t(89) = 
2.48, p = .02, d = 0.53. A t-test with the goal value as independent variable and goal value 
ratings as dependent variable revealed that participants in the high goal value condition 
regarded Frank’s goal as more valued (M = 5.51, SD = 1.56) than participants in the low goal 
value condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.98), t(88) = 3.54, p < .001, d = 0.75.
 
Meaningfulness of behavior. A two-way ANOVA with goal value and 
instrumentality as independent variables, and the composite measure of meaningfulness 
revealed no reliable main effect of the goal value manipulation, F(1, 87) = 2.09, p = .15, η2 = 
.02, but we did observe a main effect for instrumentality, F(1, 87) = 5.11, p =.03, η2 = .06. 
Specifically, participants indicated a higher level of meaningfulness of the behavior when it 
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was instrumental (M = 4.77, SD = 1.80) than when it was not instrumental (M = 3.91, SD = 
1.81). Importantly, however, the main effect was qualified by the predicted interaction 
between goal value and instrumentality, F(1, 87) = 4.06, p = .05, η2 = .05. As reflected in 
Figure 3, perceived meaningfulness was highest when the behavior was associated with a 
highly valued goal and when the behavior was high in instrumentality (M = 5.39, SD = 1.65), 
compared to when instrumentality was low for the high value goal (M = 3.81, SD = 1.82), 
t(87) = 3.07, p < .01, d = 0.66, compared to when the behavior was high in instrumentality for 
a relatively low value goal (M = 4.11, SD = 1.74), t(87) = 2.43, p = .02, d = 0.52, and 
compared to when both the Goal Value and Instrumentality were relatively low (M = 4.02, 
SD = 1.82), t(87) = 2.61, p = .01, d = 0.56. No significant differences were observed between 
the three conditions where either instrumentality was low or the goal value was relatively low 
(all ps > .56). This means that, as predicted, the same specific behavior was only considered 
relatively meaningful when it was regarded as instrumental for a highly valued goal. 
Behavior was perceived as especially meaningful when it was instrumental to pursue 
a valued goal. However, in contrast to Study 2, we did not ask participants to view the 
presented goal (qualifying for a competition) as highly valued or not, instead, more 
implicitly, we either associated this goal with a superordinate goal or we did not associate it 
with a superordinate goal. As predicted, participants derived the meaningfulness of behavior 
from its functional relationship with the value-laden superordinate goal. 
Study 4: High Versus Moderate Versus Low Instrumentality 
Studies 2 and 3 indicate that behavior is perceived as especially meaningful when it is 
instrumental in the pursuit of a valued goal. In Study 4 we included a more moderate level of 
instrumentality in order to demonstrate the validity of our hypothesis across various levels of 
instrumentality. Specifically, in addition to assessing the perceived meaningfulness of 
running on the forest’s training course for a very long time as strategy to qualify for a 
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marathon (high instrumentality) or chess competition (low instrumentality), we added a 
condition in which the behavior was a means to qualify for a horseback racing competition. 
For this type of sport activity, being a ‘fit’ by running is helpful but less instrumental than for 
running a marathon, however, the physical fitness is more instrumental for the horseback than 
for the chess competition. Hence, the horseback racing competition served as a more 
moderate instrumentality condition. 
Method 
Participants and design. Two-hundred-and thirty-three students from the University 
of Limerick were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (goal value: high vs. low) x 3 
(instrumentality: high vs. moderate vs. low) factorial design. Two participants were excluded 
from the analysis after being identified as extreme outliers (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), 
resulting in an effective sample size of two-hundred-and thirty-two participants (Mage = 
22.04, SD = 5.72; 119 men, 108 women). 
Procedure and materials. Participants were approached in study areas of the 
University of Limerick. After giving informed consent, they reported demographic 
information and read a scenario about Frank and his behavior, as in Study 2 and 3. In the high 
instrumentality condition it was stated that Frank performed this behavior in order to qualify 
for the New York City Marathon; in the moderate instrumentality condition it was stated that 
Frank tried to qualify for the New York Horseback Racing Competition; in the low 
instrumentality condition it was stated that Frank tried to qualify for the New York Chess 
Competition. Similar to Study 2, we mentioned in the high goal value condition that this goal 
was of great value and mentioned in the low goal value condition that this goal was of little 
value. 
We checked for the effectiveness of our manipulation by asking participants to 
indicate to what extent Frank’s goal was valued and to what extent Frank’s behavior was 
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helpful for pursuing this goal with identical items as in Study 2 and 3. Next, participants rated 
the extent to which they considered the behavior as meaningful and meaningless (see Study 2 
and 3). Participants were thanked and debriefed upon completion of the study. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. An ANOVA with instrumentality as independent variable and 
instrumentality ratings as dependent variable indicated significant differences between the 
conditions, F(2, 228) = 25.23, p < .001, η2 = .18. Participants in the high instrumentality 
condition regarded Frank’s behavior as more instrumental (M = 5.32, SD = 1.73) than 
participants in the moderate instrumentality condition (M = 4.03, SD = 2.19), t(228) = 3.83, p 
< .001, d = 0.51, and compared to the low instrumentality condition (M = 2.91, SD = 2.25), 
t(228) = 7.10, p < .001, d = 0.94. Also the difference between the low and moderate 
instrumentality conditions was reliable, t(228) = 3.37, p < .001, d = 0.45. A t-test with the 
goal value as independent variable and goal value ratings as dependent variable revealed that 
participants in the high goal value condition regarded Frank’s goal as more valued (M = 5.12, 
SD = 1.93) than participants in the low goal value condition (M = 3.29, SD = 2.04), t(229) = 
7.00, p < .001, d = 0.93.
 
Meaningfulness of behavior.  Scores on the rated meaningfulness and 
meaninglessness items (r = -.75, p < .001) were combined into a composite measure (after 
recoding the meaninglessness item) and then entered as dependent variable into a two-way 
ANOVA with goal value and instrumentality as independent variables. As reflected in Figure 
4, a reliable main effect of the goal value manipulation, F(1, 225) = 30.79, p < .001, η2 = .12, 
and a significant main effect of instrumentality, F(2, 225) = 6.50, p < .01, η2 = .04 were 
observed. Importantly, however, the main effects were qualified by the predicted interaction 
between goal value and instrumentality, F(2, 225) = 4.81, p < .01, η2 = .04. When 
instrumentality was low, the behavior did not reliably differ in perceived meaningfulness 
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between the low and high goal value conditions (M = 3.55, SD = 1.93 vs. M = 4.01, SD = 
2.25), t(225) = 1.15, p = .25, d = 0.15. In the moderate instrumentality condition, however, 
this difference was significant (M = 3.58, SD = 1.95 vs. M = 4.76, SD = 1.72), t(225) = 2.98, 
p < .01, d = 0.40, as was the case in the high instrumentality condition, (M = 3.70, SD = 1.57 
vs. M = 5.96, SD = 0.91), t(225) = 5.41, p < .001, d = 0.72. Moreover, none of the 
instrumentality conditions significantly differed when goal value was low (all ts < 1). When 
goal value was high, however, then the high instrumentality condition yielded significantly 
higher perceived meaningfulness ratings compared to the low instrumentality condition, 
t(225) = 4.69, p < .001, d = 0.63, and marginally significantly higher compared to the 
moderate instrumentality condition, t(225) = 1.86, p = .07, d = 0.25. In addition, a significant 
difference was observed between moderate and low instrumentality for participants in the 
high goal value condition, t(225) = 2.92, p < .01, d = 0.39. As predicted, these results reflect 
that behavior is appraised as more meaningful the more is it is regarded as instrumental for a 
highly valued goal These results converge with those from the previous studies in which the 
combination of high instrumentality and high goal value consistently led to significantly 
higher meaningfulness scores than all other combinations of instrumentality and goal value 
(all ps < .05). 
Consistent with the results of the previous studies, and in particular Study 2 and 3, the 
results of Study 4 confirmed that the appraised meaningfulness of behavior is a function of 
the interaction between instrumentality and goal value. Extending Studies 2 and 3, the current 
study included an additional condition of moderate instrumentality, providing support for the 
notion that meaningfulness of behavior is inferred from the levels of instrumentality for the 
behavior with regard to the (high vs. low) value that the goal of the behavior has. 
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Study 5: The Meaningfulness of Common Behaviors 
 Study 5 was designed to test for the robustness of the previously observed effects by 
using a very different procedure. We focused on common behaviors and used a subtle 
manipulation of the instrumentality of the behaviors by varying the instrumentality of specific 
behaviors between participants. In two pilot studies we assessed the goal value and the 
associated instrumentality of four behaviors. This was followed by the main study in which 
we manipulated the instrumentality of the behaviors with low goal value (watching television 
and reading comics) and the instrumentality of behaviors with high goal value (traveling and 
donating money to charity), and we then assessed the perceived meaningfulness of these 
behaviors. 
Method 
Pilot Study I: Goal value of behaviors. We first assessed the goal value of four 
behaviors: watching television, traveling the world, reading comics, and donating to Amnesty 
International. Thirty-one students from the University of Limerick (Mage = 21.48, SD = 2.83; 
14 men, 17 women) who received candy as reward indicated for each behavior to which 
extent it served a highly valued goal, using the item “To what extent does the following 
action serve a valuable goal?”, followed by each specific behaviors and rated on five-point 
interval scales from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Afterwards, participants were thanked, 
debriefed, and rewarded. 
 A series of paired sample t-tests indicated that the goal value associated with 
watching television (M = 1.74, SD = 0.96) was significantly lower than the goal value 
associated with traveling the world (M = 4.19, SD = 0.91), t(30) = 9.05, p < .001, d = 3.30, 
and donating money to Amnesty International (M = 3.71, SD = 0.97), t(30) = 7.14, p < .001, d 
= 2.61, but it did not significantly differ from the goal value of reading comics (M = 1.84, SD 
= 0.78; t < 1). In addition, the associated goal value of reading comics was significantly lower 
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than that of traveling the world, t(30) = 10.69, p < .001, d = 3.90, and donating money to 
Amnesty International, t(30) = 8.46, p < .001, d = 3.09. We also observed that the goal 
associated with traveling the world was significantly more valued compared to the goal value 
of donating money, t(30) = 2.18, p = .04, d = 0.80. Overall, the results suggest that 
participants considered the activities of watching television and reading comics to be 
associated with less valued goals than traveling the world and donating to Amnesty 
International. 
 Pilot Study II: Instrumentality of behaviors. Twenty-one students from the 
University of Limerick (Mage = 25.67, SD = 9.20; 10 men, 11 women) participated in a short 
internet survey (SurveyMonkey) and were asked to list a goal that they considered to be 
served by each behavior: watching television (goals were listed such as “entertainment” and 
“relaxation”), traveling to see the world (goals were listed such as “adventure” and “cultural 
knowledge”), donating money to Amnesty International (goals were listed such as “helping 
others” and “alleviating suffering”), and reading comics (goals were listed such as 
“amusement” and “having a laugh”). Asking participants to list goals was done in order to 
facilitate the assessment of the behaviors’ instrumentality. Next, participants evaluated the 
extent to which the behaviors of watching television for one hour (low instrumentality), 
watching television for two hours (high instrumentality), traveling to see the world for 2 
weeks (low instrumentality), traveling to see the world for 2 months (high instrumentality), 
donating € 50.- to Amnesty International (low instrumentality), donating € 100.- to Amnesty 
international (high instrumentality), reading one comic album (low instrumentality), and 
reading two comic albums (high instrumentality) were instrumental for the behaviors’ goals 
listed earlier. This was done using the item “Please indicate the extent to which you think that 
the below activities are helpful for achieving the goal you listed above”, followed by each of 
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the behaviors and rated on five-point interval scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
much). Afterwards, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 A series of paired sample t-tests showed that watching television for two hours (M = 
3.10, SD = 1.11) was considered to be more instrumental for the associated goal than 
watching one hour (M = 2.75, SD = 1.16), t(19) = 2.67, p = .02, d = 1.23. Traveling the world 
was perceived to be more instrumental when it lasted two months (M = 4.10, SD = 1.00) 
compared to two weeks (M = 2.57, SD = 1.36), t(20) = 6.78, p < .001, d = 3.03. Donating 
€100.- to Amnesty International was considered to be more instrumental (M = 3.80, SD = 
0.89) compared to donating € 50.- (M = 3.45, SD = 0.95), t(19) = 2.33, p = .03, d = 1.07. And 
reading two comic albums was considered to be more instrumental (M = 3.00, SD = 1.30) 
than reading one comic album (M = 2.76, SD = 1.14), t(20) = 2.50, p = .02, d = 1.12. The 
results of the second pilot study thus showed that small changes to all behaviors influenced 
the level to which they were perceived as instrumental. 
 In sum, the pilot studies identified two behaviors that were associated with a little 
valued goal and two behaviors associated with a highly valued goal, and we could identify 
how to manipulate different levels of instrumentality for all four behaviors. As a next step, 
we tested whether meaningfulness increased as a function of goal value and instrumentality. 
We predicted that behavior would be considered to be most meaningful when it was both 
associated with a highly valued goal and instrumental for the achievement of this goal. 
Importantly, we varied instrumentality of each specific behavior in a between subjects design 
and did not make any explicit reference to goal value or instrumentality. 
Participants and design. Ninety students from the University of Limerick were 
randomly assigned to either one of two between-subjects conditions of behavior examples 
(group A vs. group B). One participant was an extreme outlier and thus excluded from the 
analysis (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), resulting in an effective sample size of eighty-nine 
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participants (Mage = 20.62, SD = 3.95; 40 men, 50 women). Participants in both groups 
evaluated the two behaviors high in instrumentality and the two behaviors low in 
instrumentality, but the groups differed regarding the specific behaviors that were high or low 
in instrumentality (see procedure and Table 2). This variation was included in order to avoid 
that participants would evaluate the same behavior multiple times. 
Materials and procedure. After participants gave their informed consent and 
reported demographic information, we asked them to evaluate the extent to which they 
considered the four behaviors from the pilot studies (watching television, traveling the world, 
reading comics, and donating money to Amnesty International) to be meaningful and 
meaningless with the items “To what extent do you consider the following actions to be 
meaningful?” and “To what extent do you consider the following actions to be 
meaningless?”, each followed by the target behaviors and rated on five-point interval scales 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Averaged recoded meaningfulness scores were computed 
for each activity (.67 > rs > .83, all ps < .001). 
Based on the pilot studies we used two high goal value behaviors (e.g., donating to 
Amnesty International) and two low goal value (e.g., watching television) behaviors and 
varied their instrumentality (e.g., €50 vs. €100 and one vs. two hours, resp.). As reflected in 
Table 2, half of the participants (group A) evaluated watching television for one hour (low 
goal value, low instrumentality), reading two comic albums (low goal value, high 
instrumentality), travelling to see the world for 2 weeks (high goal value, low 
instrumentality), and donating €100.- to Amnesty International (high goal value, high 
instrumentality). The rest of the participants (group B) evaluated watching television for two 
hours (low goal value, high instrumentality), reading one comic album (low goal value, low 
instrumentality), traveling the world for 2 months (high goal value, high instrumentality), and 
donating €50.- to Amnesty International (high goal value, low instrumentality). In essence, 
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we varied between participants (group A vs. group B) the concrete form of each behavior 
example so that in each group (A and B) these behaviors would represent conditions of a 2 
(goal value: high vs. low) x 2 (instrumentality: high vs. low) within-participants design. This 
way, each participant evaluated overall four concrete behaviors with regard to their 
meaningfulness and meaninglessness. Afterwards, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
rewarded.  
Results 
Meaningfulness scores were computed for each of the four goal value x 
instrumentality combinations. For example, the perceived meaningfulness of high goal value, 
high instrumentality behavior reflected the evaluations of donating for those in group A and 
comprised on travelling evaluations for those in group B.
5
 These meaningfulness scores were 
entered as dependent variable into a within-factorial ANOVA with two factors: goal value 
was entered as first within-subjects factor, and the instrumentality of the different behaviors 
was entered as second within-subjects factor. An overview of the meaningfulness averages is 
depicted in Figure 5. 
First of all, a significant difference was found between the low and high goal value 
behaviors, F(1,88) = 230.95, p < .001, η2 = .72, indicating that the high goal value behaviors 
were seen as generally more meaningful (M = 4.34, SD = 0.60) compared to the low goal 
value behaviors (M = 2.62, SD = 0.95). No significant main effect of instrumentality 
emerged, F(1,88) = 2.53, p = .12, η2 = .03. Importantly, the predicted significant goal value x 
instrumentality interaction was observed, F(1,88) = 5.96, p = .02, η2 = .06, suggesting that the 
effect of goal value on the meaningfulness of behavior was dependent on the behaviors’ level 
of instrumentality. Specifically, in the high goal value, high instrumentality condition 
participants evaluated behavior as more meaningful (M = 4.53, SD = 0.66) compared to the 
high goal value, low instrumentality condition (M = 4.16, SD = 0.98), t(88) = 3.00, p < .01, d 
MEANINGFUL BEHAVIOR 26 
= 0.64, but also compared to the low goal value, high instrumentality condition (M = 2.59, SD 
= 1.13), t(88) = 14.61, p < .001, d = 3.11, and the low goal value, low instrumentality 
condition (2.64, SD = 1.18), t(88) = 13.78, p < .001, d = 2.94). The perceived meaningfulness 
of low goal value behavior did not differ between the high instrumentality (M = 2.59, SD = 
1.13) and the low instrumentality condition (M = 2.64, SD = 1.18; t < 1). 
The above main analysis attests that common behavior high in instrumentality when 
associated with a high value goal-value is deemed particularly meaningful, which is fully 
consistent with the results of our previous studies. To complement these main findings we 
additionally examined the effects of our instrumentality manipulation on the specific two low 
goal-value and high goal-value behaviors. Indeed, travelling was perceived as more 
meaningful under high instrumentality (M = 4.50, SD = 0.67) versus low instrumentality (M = 
4.07, SD = 1.13), F(1,87) = 4.85, p = .03, η2 = .05. The same was true for donating, which 
was appraised as more meaningful when it was highly instrumental (M = 4.55, SD = 0.66) 
compared to when it was low in instrumentality (M = 4.24, SD = 0.82), F(1,87) = 4.06, p = 
.05, η2 = .05. Fully consistent with the previous studies, no effect of instrumentality emerged 
for the low goal value behaviors of watching television and reading comics (Fs < 1). Overall, 
these results hence provide converging evidence of the predicted effects. 
Discussion 
 The present study revealed that people ascribe highest levels of meaningfulness to 
behaviors that are instrumental in serving a highly valued goal. Less meaningfulness is 
perceived if the instrumentality of behavior in serving high valued goals drops. And relatively 
little meaningfulness is ascribed to behaviors that do not serve a highly valued goal, 
independent of whether or not behaviors are instrumental for the associated goal. 
In this study, we investigated relatively common behaviors and varied their 
instrumentality in a subtle way. In addition, we assessed the behaviors’ associated goal value, 
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instrumentality, and meaningfulness in separate empirical steps, ensuring that participants did 
not base meaningfulness ratings on explicit references to goal value and instrumentality. 
Taken together, our results show that people’s existential perceptions of behavior (i.e. the 
behaviors’ meaningfulness) are based on the goals that people have and whether or not the 
available courses of actions serve highly valued goals. 
General Discussion 
What makes behavior ‘meaningful’? How can ‘meaning’ be understood from a self-
regulatory perspective? We adopted an expectancy x value approach to examine people’s 
perceptions of the extent to which behavior is meaningful. We proposed and found that 
people view those behaviors as meaningful that are useful for achieving highly valued goals. 
Behaviors that are unrelated to valued goals or not instrumental for their pursuit are likely to 
be considered as relatively meaningless. Five studies tested and confirmed the validity of this 
conceptualization of meaningful versus meaningless behavior. Throughout these studies, the 
associated goal value and the instrumentality of behaviors were independently manipulated in 
order to systematically test the hypothesis that the interaction between these two components 
(expectancy and value) is associated with appraising the behavior as relatively meaningful or 
meaningless. 
In Study 1 we asked people to evaluate behaviors that differed in goal value and 
instrumentality. Results confirmed that those behaviors that were both high in instrumentality 
and associated with a valued goal, were considered least meaningless. In Study 2 we asked all 
participants to evaluate the same behavior and found that the behavior was considered to be 
especially meaningful when it was instrumental for achieving a highly valued goal. In Study 
3 we used a superordinate goal form which goal value could be derived. As predicted, we 
also observed the goal value x instrumentality interaction. In Study 4 we added a moderate 
instrumentality condition and again observed the predicted goal value x instrumentality 
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interaction. Finally, we tested in Study 5 whether four relatively common behaviors were 
perceived as meaningful depending on their associated goal value and manipulated 
instrumentality. The results confirmed our prediction that behavior would be considered as 
meaningful when it was instrumental for the pursuit of a highly valued goal. Importantly, in 
this study we assessed goal value, instrumentality, and meaningfulness in separate empirical 
steps, ruling out the possibility that the presence of any information about goal value of 
instrumentality might affect subsequent interpretations of meaningfulness.  
Our central dependent variables were perceived meaningfulness, reversed perceived 
meaninglessness, or a combination of both throughout the studies. One could wonder whether 
these two concepts are truly each other’s opposites. In our own research, meaningfulness and 
meaninglessness were highly negatively correlated (-.66 ≤ rs ≤ -.86). Note also that past 
research has treated these concepts as opposites. For example, the presence of 
meaninglessness subsequently promotes meaningfulness (e.g., Heine et al., 2006) and cues 
that remind people of life’s meaninglessness promote the defense of meaningful worldviews 
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 2004). In addition, the assessment of meaning in life is commonly 
achieved by using a scale that is comprised of items that assess meaningfulness and 
meaninglessness (Steger et al., 2006).  
Implications 
 It is important to be precise about the implications of this research. To our knowledge, 
the psychological perception of ‘meaningfulness’ has thus far only been implied to be related 
to expectancies and values, but we made this assumption explicit and provide the necessary 
empirical support. To be clear, although we use the term ‘expectancy x value’ as a general 
characterization of our approach, we certainly subscribe to the notion of subjective 
perceptions of both the expectancy and the value components (subjective expected utility; 
e.g., Edwards, 1954). Nevertheless, by considering both components and their relationship 
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when assessing behavior, people seem to define meaningfulness in quasi ‘rational’, utilitarian 
terms, however imperfect these assessments may be. Importantly, the meaningfulness of 
behavior cannot be equated with either goal value or instrumentality, but rather reflects an 
evaluation of motivated behavior that follows from the interaction between the two. This 
observation is crucial as it highlights that ‘meaningfulness’ is used by people as a distinct 
quality that is not simply interchangeable with goal value or instrumentality. 
Relationship to psychological research on meaning-regulation. Past research and 
theorizing has often conceptualized ‘meaning’ as ‘relation’ (e.g., Heine et al., 2006) or as 
“shared mental representation of possible relationships among things, events, and 
relationships” (Baumeister, 1992, p.15). Consistent with Kasser and Sheldon’s (2004) notion 
that meaningfulness is a function of people’s goals and motivations, we proposed that 
people’s appraisals of the meaningfulness of behavior is well explained by a teleological, 
goal-based model, such as our expectancy x value approach. Our novel perspective allows for 
more precise procedures to induce and measure people’s sense of meaningfulness: Perceived 
meaningfulness is not simply equal to goal value or instrumentality, our systematic 
manipulation of both expectancy x value components demonstrate that perceived 
meaningfulness has its own quality. It is a central psychological experience in people’s 
everyday life and it is central in people’s language. 
Consistent with the notion that meaning perceptions can greatly vary across 
individuals (Steger et al., 2006), we did not restrict meaningfulness to only a certain type of 
behavior in our self-regulatory framework. Rather, depending on the individual or group 
performing the behavior and the context in which behavior takes place, perceived 
meaningfulness of behavior may vary. To give an example, the behavior of bathing in the 
river Ganges may be considered as much more meaningful by a Hindu than by a Christian. 
And parents may find it much more meaningful when their child walks for the first time in 
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life rather than when the child is fully grown. In addition, we approached meaningfulness of 
behavior as something inherently determined by people themselves, which provides 
straightforward insights into the causes, processes, and effects that accompany people’s 
experience of meaningful behavior and how they attain a sense of meaning in life. This 
flexible operationalization facilitates the design of research that investigates the mediating 
role of the perceived meaningfulness of behaviors.  
 Past research on meaning-regulation has identified that mortality salience, referring to 
a situation in which people are reminded of their inevitable death, presents a ‘threat’ to 
meaning (Greenberg et al., 2004). Why does mortality salience threaten meaning? What 
element of mortality salience constitutes the meaning threat? Is mortality inconsistent with 
how we view the world (related to the epistemic meaning concept), or does mortality makes 
our goals seems insignificant (related to teleological meaning and our expectancy x value 
approach)? Similarly, what constitutes other existential threats, such as ostracism (Case & 
Williams, 2004; Williams, 2002), uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2001), and boredom (Van 
Tilburg & Igou, 2012)? Do these meaning threats distort our understanding of the world 
(epistemic meaning), or do they signal an inability to achieve a highly valued goal 
(expectancy x value approach to meaning)? We empirically confirmed that meaningfulness is 
an evaluative term stemming from the interaction between goal value and instrumentality. 
Consequently, a future direction of our research is to test whether meaning threats affect the 
subjective instrumentality or goal value of people’s actions. Importantly, by specifying 
‘meaning’ as an interaction of self-regulatory terms we provide an important step in pointing 
out the psychological variable that is likely to mediate the effects of mortality salience, 
ostracism, uncertainty, and boredom. 
In addition, our expectancy x value approach to meaning may complement epistemic 
understandings of meaning sources, such as cultural worldviews. For example, the belief in a 
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God (e.g., Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006), donating charity to those more unfortunate in life 
(Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011c), and the 
punishment of prostitutes (e.g., Arndt, Lieberman, Cook, & Solomon, 2005), are each 
considered meaningful within their specific cultural context, presumably because they bolster 
cultural worldviews that offer a meaningful understanding of life (epistemic meaning). Yet 
one central feature is that these ‘meaningful’ behaviors are also likely to facilitate valued goal 
pursuit. To illustrate, among the religious, practicing religious rites may be considered 
helpful for securing a pleasant afterlife, helping others may be appraised as a strategy to aid 
the suffering, and retaliating against prostitutes may appear effective for protecting certain 
moral fabrics of society. Essentially, all of these behaviors are instrumental for the pursuit of 
highly valued goals that are held by those individuals or groups. Thus, besides offering 
opportunities to bolster cultural worldviews (epistemic meaning), such behaviors may 
additionally serve as sources of meaning from a teleological perspective. Both approaches 
hence provide useful tools for understanding the meaning concept from different angles and 
they may together draw an integrated picture of the meaning concept as a whole (see also 
Baumeister, 1992, pp.15-27). 
How does our expectancy x value approach to meaning relate to the appraised 
meaning of other phenomena, such as experiences, ideas, or life? Speculatively, one would 
need to identify whether and what purpose these phenomena serve, and this would 
subsequently lead people to assign meaningfulness to them or not, similar to behavior. For 
example, an idea such as the belief in the scientific method may become meaningful when 
such an idea is perceived as a useful tool for understanding the world or solving challenges 
that humanity faces. Similarly, people who believe in an afterlife may perceive life as 
meaningful in the context of gaining a place in Heaven. Interestingly, seeking for teleological 
meaning in such experiences or ideas may to some extent share similarities with what Janoff-
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Bulman and Yopyk (2004) call meaning as significance, in which people make sense of 
traumatic events by reflecting on the significance and impact that these have on them. 
Contribution, Boundary Conditions, and Future Directions 
The current research presents a novel approach to meaning: Rather than 
conceptualizing the meaningfulness of behavior in epistemic terms, we propose a teleological 
approach to meaning, and in particular we propose an expectancy x value hypothesis. As 
predicted, we found empirical support that people’s appraisal of the meaningfulness of 
behavior is consistent with this hypothesis. Generally speaking, behavior was perceived as 
most meaningful when it was highly instrumental in the pursuit of valued goals. 
There are a number of potential boundary conditions, however, that future research 
may examine further. Consider the following example: The behavior of applying for a 
promotion may appear less meaningful when one is doing this only for the associated gain in 
income rather than as a token of appreciation for hard work, even though both goals may be 
deemed highly valued. Similarly, the gratification of basic needs such as sleep, hunger, or 
thirst may often be perceived as having high value, without the behavioral means being 
regarded as particularly meaningful. Possibly, not all goals contribute equally to the 
interactive effect with instrumentality due to boundary conditions. First of all, it is possible 
that meaningfulness is more closely related to intrinsic than extrinsic goals. This assumption 
is consistent with the findings suggesting that intrinsic motivation is an important element of 
autonomy (e.g., Deci & Ryanm, 1985) and goal authenticity (Shaldon & Kasser, 1995). 
According to Kasser and Shaldon (2004, p. 484), such authentic goals are characterized by 
being motivated for autonomous interests and involve the absence of internal or external 
pressure. Future research should address whether our expectance x value approach with 
regard to the inference of meaningful behavior holds for intrinsic as well as for extrinsic 
goals. 
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What might be the function of meaning appraisals of behavior? Is meaningfulness an 
experiential outcome of the expectancy x value interaction? Does it serve some distinct 
psychological function? Consistent with psychological research on existential questions, we 
argue that meaningfulness is a psychological experience and a crucial motivational variable 
that underlies people’s judgments and behaviors. Although past research has frequently 
suggested an essential role of meaning as motivational variable in dealing with existential 
threats (e.g., Heine et al., 2004; Greenberg et al., 2004), potential mediating or moderating 
roles in self-regulatory processes have only sporadically been examined. One notable 
example is the research by Landau and colleagues (2006), who identified that responses to 
modern art were moderated by the extent to which modern art had (epistemic) meaning, 
indirectly derived from individual differences in need for structure. Recent findings on the 
experience of boredom (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011a; 2012) shed some additional light on the 
potential motivational role that meaning appraisals serve. This line of research suggests that 
the lack of meaning associated with boredom serves an important self-regulatory cue that 
triggers the pursuit of activities directed at attaining a sense of meaningfulness. Specifically, 
the engagement in boring activities triggers the subsequent motivation to engage in 
meaningful courses of action. This motivation then acts as mediator for ingroup 
identification, which an established source of meaningfulness (e.g., Castano et al., 2004; 
Spears et al., 2004). 
Although the debate whether or not meaning serves as a motivational factor has 
mostly been restricted to theorization, the above findings suggest that it indeed serves an 
important self-regulatory function. Such a self-regulatory function is also consistent with past 
research on the experience of hope (e.g., Snyder, 2000; 2002). This research suggests that 
hope promotes psychological benefits and can emerge from expectancy x value interactions. 
By identifying two elements that make behavior meaningful (instrumentality and goal value), 
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the current project enables future research to manipulate the meaningfulness of compensatory 
efforts stemming from for example boredom and mortality salience in an attempt to identify 
what motivational role meaning may fulfill. Clearly, future research should examine in detail 
whether meaning serves a motivation function in addition to being an evaluative outcome of 
expectancy x value interactions. 
Conclusion 
 ‘Meaning’ and ‘meaningfulness’ are increasingly important concepts in psychological 
research (e.g., Baumeister, 1992; Greenberg et al., 2004, Heine et al., 2006; Steger et al., 
2006). The current research presents a teleological approach to the understanding of 
meaningful behavior by adopting a specific expectancy x value perspective, distinguishing 
between the value of the goals that the behavior may serve and the instrumentality with 
which it serves the goals. In essence, our results show that people’s perception of the 
meaningfulness of behavior is applied exclusively for a particular configuration of goal value 
and instrumentality. The term ‘meaningfulness’ is not just used for any instrumental behavior 
or any act that is associated with an important goal, but the term is reserved for behavior that 
satisfies both these criteria. 
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Footnotes 
1
 The key terms in the scale’s items were originally modeled after concepts used to refer to 
meaning in for example Steger et al. (2006, p. 85; p. 85; p. 80) and Baumeister (1991; p. 16; 
p. 49); the items were successfully used in our prior research (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011c). 
2
 Gender did not seem to have any systematic effect on our results across any of the five 
studies. Overall, six marginal effects were observed and only one unexpected significant 
effect. Specifically, a marginal effect of gender on the instrumentality manipulation check 
was observed in Study 4, F(1, 221) = 3.60, p = .06, η2= 0.01. Moreover, in Pilot Study I a 
marginal main effect of gender on the aggregated value of travelling and donating was found, 
F(1, 29) = 3.04, p = .09, η2= 0.10, as well as two marginal interaction effects of gender on the 
difference between value attached to watching television versus travelling, F(1, 29) = 3.16, p 
= .09, η2= 0.10, and the difference between watching television and reading comics, F(1, 29) 
= 2.96, p = .10, η2= 0.09. A fourth marginal interaction with gender was observed in Pilot 
Study II with the difference in perceived instrumentality of watching television for one hour 
versus two hours, F(1, 18) = 2.99, p = .10, η2= 0.14, and a fifth marginal effect involved an 
interaction with instrumentality in Study 5, F(1, 85) = 3.50, p = .07, η2= 0.13. The sole 
significant effect of gender was an interaction with the goal value factor in Study 5, F(1, 85) 
= 5.54, p = .02, η2= 0.11. 
3
 Levene’s test indicated a violation of the assumption of equal variances across conditions, 
F(3, 74) = 5.37, p < .01. The analysis with log10 transformed meaninglessness scores yielded 
similar results. High goal value led to lower levels of perceived meaninglessness of behavior 
than low goal value, F(1, 74) = 7.99, p < .01, η2 = .10, and high instrumentality of behavior 
led to lower meaninglessness ratings than low instrumentality, F(1, 74) = 6.71, p = .01, η2 = 
.08. Importantly, also the critical interaction between goal value and instrumentality emerged, 
F(1, 74) = 14.47, p < .001, η2 = .16. Details can be provided on request. 
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4
 We identified outliers based on the criteria based on Tabachnick and Fidell (2007; pp. 73-
76). Regarding univariate outliers, participants with very large standardized scores (Z > 3.29, 
p < .001) were excluded. Regarding multivariate outliers, participants’ Mahalanobis distances 
were computed based on the variables of the design, but excluding age and gender. The 
mahalanobis distances were then compared to a χ2 distribution and those participants 
exceeding a critical value with a α-level of .001 were considered to be outliers. 
5
 Similar results were obtained when including participants’ assigned group as between 
subjects variable and treating each of the behaviors as group-dependent indicator, as analyzed 
in a 2 (Goal Value) x 2 (Instrumentality) x 2 (Group) mixed-ANOVA. This analysis yielded 
the critical three-way interaction, F(1,87) = 6.54, p = .01, η2 = .07, and a two-way interaction 
under high goal value, F(1,87) = 9.15, p < .01, η2 = .10, but not under low goal value (F < 1). 
Details can be provided on request. 
 
MEANINGFUL BEHAVIOR 43 
 
Table 1 
Examples of Listed Behaviors and Goals (Study 1) 
  Low Goal Value Condition  High Goal Value Condition 
Instrumentality  Goal  Behavior  Goal  Behavior 
Low  ‘sleeping in’  ‘Setting my alarm for 7’  ‘to get a job’  ‘It wouldn't help if I would think of all 
the possible things that might go wrong’ 
High  ‘being really good at 
grammar’ 
 ‘checking the red lines in Word to see 
where I made mistakes’ 
 ‘Dieting’  ‘sports, like playing tennis and jogging’ 
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Table 2 
Overview of the Design Employed in the Main Experiment (Study 5) 
  Instrumentality (Within) 
Group (Between)  Low  High 
A  
   Goal Value (Within) 
    
    High   Traveling World 2 Weeks  Donating €100 
    Low   Watching TV 1 hour  Reading 2 Comic Albums 
B 
   Goal Value (Within) 
    
    High   Donating €50  Traveling World 2 Months 
    Low   Reading 1 Comic Album  Watching TV 2 hours. 
Note: The study employed a 3-factorial design. Instrumentality and Goal Value were  within-
participants variables. We varied between participants whether the specific high versus low 
valued goal behavior was high versus low in instrumentality. 
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Figure 1: The Meaninglessness of Recalled Behaviors (Study 1) 
Figure 1: Perceived meaningfulness of participants’ own past behavior as a 
function of the behavior’s associated goal value and the instrumentality of the 
behavior for the pursuit of this goal. 
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Figure 2: The Meaningfulness of Running (Study 2) 
Figure 2: Perceived meaningfulness of ‘running along the forest’s training 
course for a very long time’ as a function of the behavior’s associated goal value 
and the instrumentality of the behavior for the pursuit of this goal. 
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Figure 3: The Meaningfulness of Running (Study 3) 
Figure 3: Perceived meaningfulness of ‘running along the forest’s training 
course for a very long time’ as a function the instrumentality and the presence of 
a superordinate goal. 
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Figure 4: The Meaningfulness of Running (Study 4) 
Figure 4: Perceived meaningfulness of ‘running along the forest’s training 
course for a very long time’ as a function of the behavior’s associated goal value 
and the instrumentality of the behavior for the pursuit of this goal 
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Figure 5: Perceived meaningfulness of common behaviors as a function of their goal value 
and instrumentality in the pursuit of this goal.  
Figure 5: The Meaningfulness of Common Behaviors (Study 5) 
 
